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JOHN COGGON 1 
Introduction 
The ascendance and dominance of autonomy in bioethics and biolaw seem to be 
beyond doubt. Certainly as an ethical principle it is widely afforded a supreme status, 
to the extent that an increasing number of authors now argue that it is too highly 
valued. However, in Autonomy, Consent and the Law, Sheila McLean seeks to 
interrogate the received wisdom that autonomy really is given the reverent protection 
that so much bioethical literature might have us believe it enjoys. Through a detailed 
and wide-ranging theoretical, legal, and social analysis, McLean provides a thoughtful 
and powerful response to those who would argue that English and Scottish medical 
and healthcare laws have the promotion of patient autonomy at their heart. Her core 
thesis is that, “no matter what conventional wisdom says, there may be a dissonance 
between the aims of respect for autonomy on the one hand and the law of consent on 
the other.” And her scepticism on this point naturally leads her to ask “if it [consent 
law] is not there to reflect respect for autonomous decisions, what is it for?” (p.5) 
 
Beneath McLean’s analysis are two prominent strands of thought that make her thesis 
particularly interesting. First, she seems to favour a robust protection of patient 
autonomy. Whilst she often expresses views that are sympathetic with calls for more 
constrained understandings of, or respect for, autonomy, her project seems in large 
part to frame itself within a reading of Millian liberalism that emphasises the good of 
individuals’ being self-governors. Second, and in interesting contrast, she is at times 
reluctant to commit to a particular understanding. As I will describe below, McLean 
presents two dominant clusters of ideas about what autonomy is, and sometimes she 
tries to reconcile the two camps. In large part, however, her project is to criticise 
inconsistency of principles within the law itself. I will first provide an overview of the 
book, and then in a brief discussion explore two analytic points that may be the source 
of further critical legal analysis. 
Autonomy, Consent and the Law: Structure and argument 
The book comprises eight chapters. The first three provide the theoretical context and 
analytic framework. The next four are individual case studies, considering the role of 
autonomy in the context of particular issues. Finally there is a short but substantive 
concluding chapter. To structure the book in this way makes eminent sense, allowing 
for the logical development of its core ideas and the presentation and exploration of 
an important thesis. As so much has been written on autonomy, some of the 
discussion falls on fairly ‘standard’ territory. However, given its critical approach, and 
widely researched argument, the text offers a great deal for those who work in this 
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area, as well as to more general readers interested to learn about autonomy, consent, 
and health law. 
 
Chapter 1 begins the contextualisation. It offers a brief history of medicine, describing 
(in broad terms) three stages “[f]rom  Hippocrates to paternalism to autonomy”. (p.6) 
With autonomy representing the current ideology, McLean suggests that in law and 
practice distinct conceptual questions necessarily arise, and their happy harmonisation 
is the goal of contemporary bioethics: “Separating the clinical from the personal or 
private, or perhaps ideally rendering them complementary, is a necessary goal of the 
anti-paternalism rhetoric that now permeates bioethics and the law.” (p.12) Noting 
that “the most powerful language of the 20th and 21st centuries” is that of human 
rights, McLean concludes a short survey of understandings of autonomy by selecting 
two conceptions of it that are relevant within human rights analysis. These are “a 
highly individual account of autonomy” and “one which concerns itself with the 
person as a part of a community”. Thus she contrasts “an individualistic and a 
relational account of autonomy.” (p.17) 
 
As already noted, a large part of McLean’s project is directed to emphasising 
similarities between arguments rooted in these competing means of conceptualising 
autonomy. For McLean, it does not seem a weakness for ‘autonomy’ that people 
radically disagree about what it means while widely holding that the word represents 
something important. In chapter 2 she explores the mechanisms that would help 
protect different conceptions of autonomy. She considers how the individualistic or 
communitarian accounts would favour or find problems with different approaches, 
and—importantly in legal treatment of principle—addresses practical difficulties. It 
becomes clear that all abstract concerns associated with the attainment and exercise of 
autonomy can not be addressed by general policy or practices. McLean thus argues, 
for example, that: 
 
[B]ecause understanding and reasoning cannot be subjected to the 
kinds of tests that competence and quantity of information can be, I 
would argue that they are of a different order from the other concepts 
that are central to the process of obtaining or offering a valid 
consent. (p.51) 
 
Such points, building on ‘real world’ limitations both to being autonomous and to 
assessing someone’s autonomy lead to the view that: 
 
The assessment that a person is legally competent, implying that s/he 
is autonomous and therefore that his or her decisions are worthy of 
respect, does not in and of itself mean that the ensuing decision will 
be an autonomous one – which might arguably be the most 
important consideration. After all, it might be asked, what is the 
point of valuing (and agonising over) autonomy if it is just a sham – 
a philosophical concept that has no bearing on the real world? (p.63) 
 
Having provided a theoretical contextualisation, McLean moves in chapter 3 to a 
general analysis of the law. The aims are twofold: first, to explore the criteria the law 
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provides to judge whether consent is valid; and second, to establish whether the law 
on consent can be said to protect autonomy. She believes that the strong reasons to 
respect patient autonomy derive from the importance people (should) attach to making 
their lives their own; to making their own decisions. Given this, her legal critique 
leads her to argue that there is a considerable divide between what would be desirable 
ethically, and what is protected at law through the mechanisms of consent. This 
contention is based primarily on the argument that the legal tests that establish the 
validity of consent relate not to the patient him- or herself, but to an abstraction 
analogous with law’s ‘reasonable man’. This approach, she argues, is based on ‘policy 
reasons’ that should be offensive not only to advocates of individual autonomy, but 
also to those who champion relational accounts. 
 
Following her presentation of the general groundwork in the first three chapters, 
McLean then tests the law’s protection of autonomy against specific case studies. In 
some senses at this stage, the reader may feel that the outcome will be quite 
predictable: if at a general level the law fails, it surely will when considered in 
specific areas. But McLean’s purpose is not just to demonstrate that the law fails, it is 
also to consider how and why it fails. The discrepancies that are highlighted in 
chapters 4-7, then, prove interesting reading.  This will be particularly so for scholars 
who, like McLean, have a strong concern for principled consistency within a legal 
system, and consider that protection of autonomy should hold a prized place within it. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on autonomy at the end of life. As one might expect, it works 
through a contrast between fatal refusals of consent—where an individualistic 
autonomy prevails at law—and consent (were it legally possible) to active life-ending 
measures, where a relational model constrains the scope for choice. An evaluation of 
the act/omission dispute leads McLean to agree with many others that the distinction 
carries no moral weight whatsoever, and is used to do more by the law than it 
coherently can. She likewise voices strong scepticism about slippery slope arguments, 
suggesting that they are used as a cover for ideological reasons to oppose the 
legalisation of active assisted-dying. This leads, in the chapter’s conclusion, to a claim 
that in the instance of end-of-life law, there is a split rather than a meaningful overlap 
between individual autonomy and relational autonomy. And in McLean’s view, this 
split can not be justified. 
 
Autonomy and pregnancy is the subject of chapter 5. McLean’s interest here rests 
primarily on state control of pregnant women’s lifestyle choices, and refusals of 
consent to medically-indicated caesarean sections. In some ways, I found this chapter 
incongruous with McLean’s overall project. The moral debates about the 
‘maternal/fetal conflict’ or ‘the rights of the unborn’ are well known, but they do not 
translate into autonomy-limiting measures in English or Scottish law. Thus the 
principal focus of the chapter seems to be on dubious social practices and over-
zealous state-actors doing things that are unlawful (and found to be so). Moreover, the 
worst affronts to autonomy that she describes are found in the United States. Although 
in itself this makes very interesting reading, and provides a good comparative social 
analysis, it somehow does not chime with the purposes of McLean’s thesis. 
 
 
7          Genomics, Society and Policy 
             2010, Vol.6, No.1 pp.80-86 
 
_____________    
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.6, No.1 (2010) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
83
Ultimately, and in agreement with the current legal position, her judgment of how the 
law should be is as follows: 
 
Defending women’s freedom in this situation seems to require 
adherence to the individualistic model; anything else arguably opens 
the door to coercion. As was seen in the case of assisted dying, the 
law’s ingenuity in simultaneously proclaiming adherence to 
individual autonomy yet using a more relational account to reject its 
application in hard cases knows no bounds. (p.152) 
 
Perhaps of most pertinence to readers of Genomics, Society and Policy is chapter 6 of 
McLean’s book, which considers autonomy and genetic information. This chapter 
naturally broadens the scope of analysis: it is still health-related, but no longer just 
bears on patients’ autonomy. McLean highlights the normative complications that 
might arise should an analogy fail between arguments about rights in relation to 
healthcare and rights that might arise in relation to control and use of genetic 
information. As she puts it, “genetic information [is] different from most other 
medical knowledge on two counts; first, because it is not only information about the 
individual and second because it may also affect reproductive decisions.” (p.159) 
Throughout the chapter, McLean offers an insightful overview, but one that often 
serves more to present the different arguments than to resolve them. She looks both at 
the troublesome issues relating to parental autonomy versus the interests of children, 
and to establishing the proper limits of adult’s privacy in relation to their own genetic 
information. In some senses, the chapter considers in closer detail the pros and cons of 
things that the law might do, than give a clear answer about what it should do. There 
is useful discussion of legislation and litigation in the United States, whose position 
stands in some contrast to that in the United Kingdom, where general norms in 
relation to confidentiality and privacy apply. McLean seems to favour here the 
invocation of a more relational autonomy, suggesting that some duties-to-others ought 
to be enforced at law (or at least considered). This might be seen to undermine her 
own calls for consistency in legal protections of autonomy, as she has earlier 
condemned legal failures to use an individualistic conception (though she may 
respond that the other arguments in the book concern patient autonomy). McLean 
anyway predicts that developments in genetics will force courts or law-makers to 
consider the issue head-on, and offers a clear account of how controversial any 
developments (or attachment to the status quo) will be. 
 
Chapter 7 looks at autonomy and organ transplantation. In somewhat similar vein to 
chapter 5, McLean’s focus in this chapter in some ways is more about possible policy 
approaches within her dualist autonomy framework than it is about critiquing current 
law. She refers throughout to relevant legal positions, but the argument is aimed 
mainly at an evaluation of different possible means of regulating to increase 
posthumous organ ‘donation’. McLean cautions against too simplistic an appraisal, or 
too readily accepting the idea that there can be an ‘easy fix’ response: infrastructure 
needs to be addressed as much as the policy, whatever ideology underlies it. 
Furthermore, given the manifest uncertainties and difficulties of successfully 
increasing transplantation rates through any change in policy, McLean advocates 
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especial caution against abandoning a commitment to (real) consent. In particular she 
urges concern about the fashion for supporting ‘opting-out’ systems, suggesting that 
greater evidence is needed to support adoption of such an approach. Thus, while she 
accepts that at present the law protects individual autonomy, she fears there is 
pressure to move away from this. Should that happen, it would be a further 
inconsistency that she would rather have seen resisted unless very good evidence were 
produced of its efficacy; evidence that she thinks does not yet exist. 
 
The concluding chapter, naturally enough, restates the key points of analysis and 
emphasises the core of McLean’s thesis: that it is wrong to assume that the law of 
consent is based on autonomy; and that the law fails to provide a coherent and 
consistently principled approach to questions where autonomy is under issue. She 
says: 
 
[I]t is unclear that the law of consent has precisely the same goals as 
does the concept of autonomy. Although they are often taken to be 
equivalent, when reaching decisions and balancing the rights and 
interests of the parties concerned, courts take account of agendas 
which reflect a wider spectrum of interests than those directly in 
front of them, for example the effect on society of reaching one 
decision or another. (p.217) 
 
She also restates her claim that whilst there seem to be two dominant clusters of 
autonomy conceptions—individualist and relational—there is often an overlap 
between them, allowing for “some congruence between the two”, which, she suggests, 
would be “both feasible and desirable.” (p.225) 
Discussion 
There is much to recommend McLean’s analysis of autonomy and the law, and her 
arguments about consent’s detachment from autonomy are persuasive. I would, 
however, raise a couple of analytic issues, not so much in criticism of McLean’s 
position, but to add to the debate. First, her categorisations of individualistic versus 
relational autonomy concepts are perfectly reasonable, and her discussion of their 
potential for reconciliation interesting. It seems, however, that the concepts she 
addresses do not sit at polar extremes of a continuum from total individualism to 
strong collectivism. Instead, they already come from somewhere in the ‘middle 
ground’. As such, much of the scope for meaningful dispute between the concepts’ 
advocates is already lost. And second, in some sense contrarily, I wonder too if there 
is an aspect of the concepts (at least in the broad way they are applied) that actually 
makes them (at least theoretically) irreconcilable. In the remainder of this review I 
will reflect on each of these points in turn. 
 
McLean takes it as given that there is a legal system, and that there is no principled 
problem with there being a legal system. Concerning accounts of ‘individual 
autonomy’, such a position is, of course, very contentious. You need only to consider 
the anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff2 or the literature in political philosophy and 
jurisprudence on legitimacy and authority to see the potential force of truly individual 
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autonomy. By conceding the validity of law, an analyst is already giving normative 
endorsement to at least some level of collectivism. Granted this, relational concerns 
are bound to feature in a discussion of people’s legitimate freedom. Similarly, an 
advocate for relational accounts will rarely (if ever) want to argue that people should 
have no freedom. Given this, partial reconciliation between what members of each 
camp would argue for is almost inevitable. Put simply, the individualists that interest 
McLean necessarily endorse some level of collectivism, and the collectivists that 
interest her would argue in favour of some level of individualism. 
 
This point is important, and to take it forward, I would be interested to see an equally 
focused analysis of liberty. McLean does discuss this concept, and other important 
issues such as the public/private distinction. In future discussion I think they both 
warrant further attention still. I agree with McLean’s concerns about practical 
limitations both to being autonomous, and to assessing autonomy effectively. To say 
that autonomy is important, and in some instances foundational, is true. But if we are 
to make a complete assessment of the law, we need to know about the other matters of 
concern and how to mediate apparent conflicts between them. It is my own view that 
within the caselaw at least, the confusing or conflating of autonomy and liberty has 
led to some of the more troublesome aspects of current English medico-legal 
jurisprudence. An exploration of such issues would shed further light on the problems 
McLean uncovers, and may also help lead to some of their resolution. 
 
Finally I would just raise a question about whether the two accounts of autonomy are 
formally reconcilable. At times, individualistic autonomy is described as a concept 
that is morally hollow. This does not preclude its having a moral foundation, or its 
being morally important. Rather, it means that there is no role for judgment of the 
choice that is made; a person’s choice is what is privileged, regardless of its content. 
Thus, people on this count (or some counts included in this count!) would be free—
with this freedom legally protected—to make decisions for any reason whatsoever. 
The relational account, by contrast, seems to have an internal system of morality, 
meaning that only some choices that might be exercised ‘really are’ autonomous. 
McLean often reminds us that endorsing an individualistic model in many instances 
need not entail a commitment, for example, to selfishness. Nevertheless, where one 
concept has inherent moral dictates and the other lacks these, it is not clear that they 
are reconcilable at the level of principle. 
Conclusion 
Autonomy, Consent and the Law is a wide ranging and thought provoking book. I 
recommend it to anyone interested in the mechanism of consent in health law, and 
particularly to people interested in the interplay between law and ethics in healthcare. 
Its key thesis is argued persuasively, and presents a challenge to courts and law-
makers, and also to scholars who would wish to see autonomy protected or enhanced 
in practice. 
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